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Comm«ntan//Johnson-Laird & Byrne: Deduction
six athletes, to check that they too turn out to be canoeists? But
of course we do not - because we see that no matter how many
athletes there are, each athlete has to be a baker by the first
premise, and a canoeist by the second premise - but note that
that is a logical argument which contains a variable ("each
athlete") that is not allowed in J-L & B's theory. Thus, J-L & B's
theory does not account for people's perception of the necessity
of the conclusion without checking other models. (Of course,
given some logic, no model is needed to solve that particular
syllogism.)
Second, although the theory claims to invoke only specific
instances, parts of the theory appear to make tacit use of
variables, and even of inference rules. As one example, consider
the logic of"[], ' the "exhaustivity tag."This ensures that, given a
model such as
[a] b
[a] b
the left-hand column must be fleshed out with [~a], for
example,
[a] b
[a] b
[~a] b
[~a] ~b
The meaning of"[]" appears to be given by a tacit inference rule
(with variables):
y is an unrepresented entry in a column that contains "[x]'
y = [~x]
J-L & B would also need the rule:
t~~x] = [x]
Thus, some mental logic is implicit in J-L & B's theory, making it
a hybrid theory and blunting the logic/model opposition that J-L
& B insist on.
Third, many versions of the mental-logic thesis assume that
some logical apparatus is developmentally primitive - part of an
innate format for representing declarative knowledge, of a
syntax of thought (e.g., Braine 1990; 1992; in press; O'Brien, in
press; cf. Fodor 1975). This would be consistent with the very
widespread, and perhaps universal appearance in human lan-
guages of connectives similar to English and, or, if, and nega-
tion, in association with the same common inference forms;
likewise, one tends to find words for all and each, and there are
other logical elements (e.g., certain modals) that may be univer-
sal. A mental logic provides a more natural explanation than
mental models of the reason why these particular elements
should be so common.
Finally, J-L & B's theory requires the concept of an uncon-
scious mental model held in working memory, a paradoxical
combination: Information-processing theories customarily take
the content of working memory as accessible to consciousness
(e.g., Ericsson & Simon 1984). Mental models clearly are often
accessible to consciousness, as any reader can attest who at-
tempts the spatial relations problems in J-L & B's Chapter 5.
(Similarly, in the folk science exemplified in Gentner & Stevens
[1983], the models were generally accessible to consciousness.)
However, for logic problems, introspection suggests that sub-
jects do not consistently use the kinds of models proposed.
Models are usually not reported in propositional problems (in
our experience - cf. Braine etal. 1984); for other logic problems,
old evidence (Starring, cited in Woodworth 1938), which is
consistent with unpublished work of O'Brien and myself, sug-
gests that there is great variation across people and problems in
whether models are reported, and in the kind of model re-
ported. I cannot help thinking that the purpose of the uncon-
sciousness postulate is to shield the theory from this obvious
kind of evidence. At the very least, J-L & B need to explain the
variability in what people report.
In sum, I have argued, first, that mental models cannot suffice
for reasoning, given J-L & B's notion 'of model; second, that
some mental logic is implicit in J-L & B's theory, making it more
of a hybrid than they allow; third, that the common logical
apparatus of human languages argues for a mental logic and is
hard to explain using J-L & B's theory; and, finally, that there
is a deep problem with J-L & B's rejection of introspective
evidence.
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1. Introduction. Johnson-Laird & Byrne (J-L & B) are to be
congratulated on proposing a new mechanism for deductive
inference and for presenting extensive evidence for the psycho-
logical validity of this mechanism. I will have no quarrel with
this mechanism or with the psychological claims; both deserve
attention and further investigation. My argument is against the
implied epistemic nature of the new mechanism.
In Deduction, the mental-model mechanism is described as a
"semantic procedure " (p. 23) and is said to be "compatible with
the way in which logicians formulate a semantics for a calculus"
(p. 36). Mental models are contrasted strongly with rule-based
mechanisms (e.g., pp. 23, 195). The implication, whether in-
tended or not, is that the mental-model mechanism directly
addresses the problem of intentionality. A mental-model-based
computer program, it seems, would automatically give meaning
to computational states.
I will argue that this implication is wrong; mental models have
no more to say about intentionality than rule-based mecha-
nisms. The attachment of the adjective "semantic" to a deduc-
tive mechanism, or to any computer program, is misleading and
confusing. The phrase "semantic procedure" is an oxymoron.
Mental-model and rule-based mechanisms differ only in degree
and not in kind.
2. The meanings of "semantics." Unfortunately, the issue is
clouded because the word "semantics" is used in different ways
by different communities. For example, logicians use it to
describe a mapping from the expressions of a logical theory to
the "meaning" of these expressions. To give a semantics to a logic
is to provide this mapping. Tarski provided a semantics for
predicate calculus by showing how logical sentences in a theory
could be mapped to truth or falsity in a model.
There is an ambiguity about whether these models are aspects
of the real world or mathematical theories in their own right. For
a semantics to map formulae to their meaning, models should be
part of the real world. However, there are several forces encour-
aging their formalisation as mathematical theories. Formulae in
commonsense reasoning are relatively easy to map to the real
world. For example, in loves (John, Mary) the constants John
and Mary map to specific individuals John and Mary, loves to the
relationship of loving and loves (john, inary) to the assertion that
John loves Mary. Mathematical formulae, for example, 2 + 2 =
4, are harder to map to the real world because the coherence of
the mapping presupposes a platonic commitment to the exis-
tence of 2, 4, and so on. Couple this with the natural tendency of
mathematicians to formalise, and it becomes easier for them to
regard models as mathematical theories of sets of objects on
which functions and relations are defined. The sense of "seman-
tics" in which it assigns "meaning" is then lost.
Linguists generally use "semantics" to describe, not the
mapping to a meaning, but the meaning itself. A semantic
representation of a natural language sentence is contrasted with
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the syntactic representation. The syntactic representation is the
original string of words or a parse tree with these words labelling
the leaves. The semantic representation must capture not this
grammatical structure but its content. Confusingly, this is usu-
ally done by a logical formula; so the linguist's semantics is the
logician's syntax!
Computer scientists use the word "semantics to describe the
mapping from a programming language to a mathematical
theory. Ironically, this turns the logician's usage on its head.
Logical semantics translates a mathematical formula into a
program for calculating a truth value; computer science seman-
tics translates a program into a mathematical formula.
Because of their remark on p. 36 of Deduction (see para. 1
above), I will assume that J-L & B intend the word "semantics" in
the logician's sense. I assume that their mental models are based
on Tarskis models of logical theories; that their deductive
mechanism is an attempt to reason in the model theory in
contrast to rule-based mechanisms that reason in the proof
theory. I claim that it is not possible to do this.
3. Is semantic reasoning possible? If we regard Tarskian
models as part of the real world, then reasoning with them
would entail physically manipulating the real world. This has
limited utility. It is not possible to conduct forward planning,
hypothetical reasoning, counterfactual reasoning or abstract
reasoning by manipulating the current world state. We must
reason by manipulating an internal representation of the world.
At this point the problems of intentionality emerge, that is,
we need a semantics to map this internal representation onto its
meaning. This remains true even if the internal representation
is based on a Tarskian model. Calling the manipulation proce-
dure "semantic does not affect the situation.
Basing a computational reasoning mechanism on Tarskian
models presents problems for a finite computer. For example,
some models have an infinite domain of objects. Some reasoning
involves proving that an infinite collection of objects has a
property. Some reasoning involves the representation and use of
incomplete or vague information. These problems are solved in
rule-based mechanisms by the use of quantifiers, variables,
disjunction, and so forth. Some equivalent device is needed in
model-based reasoners if they are to have the same reasoning
power. J-L & B use such devices in their mental-model mecha-
nism. For example, infinite numbers of objects are represented
by a finite number of tokens; incomplete information is repre-
sented by having alternative models to cover the range of
possibilities.
4. Are rule- and model-based reasoners different in kind? One
paradigmatic example of a rule-based deductive system is a
resolution-based theorem prover. The rules are formulae of
predicate calculus in clausal form representing the axioms of the
theory and the negation of the conjecture. The conjecture is
proved by reductio ad absurdum; the clauses are "resolved'
together, usually exhaustively, until the empty clause is
derived.
However, resolution can also be viewed as a systematic
attempt to check that none of the models of the theory provide a
counterexample to the conjecture. The fact that resolution can
be viewed in this way goes back to a metalogical theorem of
Herbrand's. If the attempt to prove the conjecture fails after a
finite search then a counterexample to the conjecture can be
read off automatically from the failed attempt. Thus resolution
can be viewed both as a rule-based and as a model-based
mechanism!
This potential duality was brought home to me forcibly as a
result of my first foray into automatic theorem proving. I built a
model-based theorem prover for arithmetic called SUMS (Bundy
1973). Its model consisted of a representation of the "real line" as
used by mathematicians in informal blackboard arguments. The
hypotheses of the theorem were represented by placing points
in appropriate positions on this "real line" and the conclusion
was then read off from the model.
As I tried to get SUMS to prove harder and harder theorems,
this simple idea became more and more elaborate. For example,
consequences of the original hypotheses had to be propagated
around the model before the conclusion could be read off. The
natural propagation mechanism was forward-chaining with
rules. After a while I realised that I had just built yet another
rule-based mechanism, SUMS was now similar to a standard
semantic tableau prover with a bottom-up search strategy, SUMS'
progression from model-based to rule-based was incremental.
There was no point at which the nature of its reasoning dramat-
ically changed in kind.
5. Conclusion. I have argued that there is no difference in
kind between the mental-model deduction mechanism of J-L &
B and rule-based mechanisms. Indeed, it is possible to view
many deduction mechanisms as simultaneously of both types.
The issue of intentionality arises with both types of mechanism,
and is not finessed by the use of a model-based approach. To the
best of my knowledge J-L & B make no claim to the contrary.
However, others may erroneously draw that conclusion from the
free use of words like "semantics," "model," and so forth. For
this reason I recommend that the word "semantics" be used with
extreme caution. It is a highly ambiguous term and has great
potential to mislead.
None of this detracts from Johnson-Laird & Byrne's signifi-
cant contribution in defining a new deduction mechanism and
providing evidence for its psychological validity.
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Johnson-Laird & Byrne (J-L & B) are equivocal concerning the
scope of mental-model theory. On the one hand, they are careful
to note that mental models are aimed primarily at explaining
deduction, although commonsense inference is not deductive in
character. On the other hand, they contend that mental-model
theory solves the problem of nonmonotonic reasoning, which is
not deductive and is characteristic of commonsense inference.
This equivocation requires clarification: An account of deductive
reasoning casts light on a fascinating if rather arcane human
ability; an account of nonmonotonic inference in general would
be little short of a theory of thinking. It is not clear, therefore,
exactly what J-L & B see as the domain of the mental-model
account. I shall argue that mental-model theory does not in fact
address the problem of understanding commonsense non-
monotonic reasoning, still less provide a solution to it.
Everyday, commonsense reasoning may be conceived of as a
species of inference to the best explanation: It involves inferring
from given information to what best explains and is best ex-
plained by that information (Fodor 1983). Such inference is
nonmonotonic, because the addition of new information can
invalidate what were previously plausible conclusions. So, for
example, the plausible inference from hearing the sound of
purring behind the door to the conclusion that the cat is trapped
in the cellar is immediately overridden if I catch sight of the cat
in the garden. The premise on which the inference is based, the
purring, need not be withdrawn, although another explanation
for this fact may be sought. By contrast, in monotonic reasoning,
the conclusion of a valid argument can only be challenged if one
of its premises is false.
Providing an account of inference to the best explanation is
very difficult. Inference to the best explanation encompasses
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